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Abstract 
 In this essay a simplified game of poker, a two-person one-card poker with unitary bet 
size was analyzed in means of every possible scenario possible to occur between to rational 
players. The outcomes of these scenarios were properly placed together to find an equation for 
one of the player’s expected value. Then this expected value was briefly analyzed for each 
player. It was found out that one of the players, the one in the dealer position, had an unbeatable 
strategy. Due to this fact, the dealer simply had the advantage. It was stated that this problem, for 
this game, can be solved by replacing the roles of the players each round.  
A real situation concerning the expansion of airline transportation in Turkey was inspected and 
features and the moves of the poker game were easily transposed into that situation. After that, a 
scenario was created including two rival markets in the same street. By accepting a multiple of 
assumptions, many moves from the poker game were interpreted into this scenario and the 
opener, who had the disadvantage in the poker game, at some point, succeeded to gain a positive 
EV. During the period of changing strategies, it never looked the most beneficial for the dealer to 
activate their unbeatable strategy due to the content of the scenario. It was seen that the basic 
poker model taken was good enough to analyze and explain a multiple of decisions and moves 
made by real-life companies or small businesses. It was also seen that it is the untouchable 
strategies do not always seem to be the most beneficial for the player. 
Word Count: 268 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Game Theory 
Game Theory studies the interactions between rational players which produce outcomes 
according to combination of moves made by each individual player. Purpose of using game 
theory is to generate the optimum strategy for a player which will produce the most beneficial 
payoff for the player. The game theory can be used for any type of strategic interactions between 
individuals, groups or companies which allow this study apply to many social sciences such as 
economics or business yet I will be using game theory to analyze and find optimal strategies for 
a simplified, two-person zero-sum poker game. Then I will explain a multiple of campaigns or 
moves made by companies and prove the profitability of each move using the calculations from 
the poker analysis. Therefore, the research question is: How well can a simplified, two-person 
zero-sum poker game analysis help to interpret basic decisions and moves made by companies 
and small businesses? 
2. Poker 
The card game of poker has always been an interest for me since I learned to play the 
game. When I was introduced to the Game Theory and learned about the poker application, I 
thought this would be a good opportunity for me to analyze the Poker game more deeply and an 
interesting topic for my extended essay. Then it came to my mind that explaining some moves 
made by companies by referencing a poker game might be an interesting way to show the use of 
game theory in economics.  
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Poker is considered as a multi-player sequential zero-sum game with imperfect 
information. In this type of game, a sequential game, the action of the player can be strategized 
not only in the beginning but also at any point of the game. The player does not know each 
action every other player took, ∴ there is no best move for the player. Poker is a zero-sum game 
where winning of a player can only be attained through losing of other players. 
 
Optimal strategies can theoretically be computed using game theory. Although this is the 
case, in the real-world application of poker, outside the experimental environment, there are too 
many variables to consider and it would be unwise and uneasy to base the entire playing strategy 
only on these optimal strategies gained through this type of analysis. 
 
2.1. Strategic Form: 
It is the form of representing a game using a matrix where each box represents the payoff 
for a set of strategies. This method can be used for a simple analysis yet it is a compact view of 
the game and should be used for simultaneous games where no player is aware of other’s 
strategies, ∴ there won’t be any dominated strategies which should have been removed. This 
way, a mixed strategy can be found, which is basically what move to do and how frequently to 
do this move to optimize the average payoff. The representation is also known as the Normal 
form, as seen in the example: 
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Player A 
  
option 1 
 
option 2 
Player B 
option 1 
 
option 2 
 
Yet, this form has no use for our purposes since it can only show the payoff of the 
decisions, it is the steps leading to it we are interested in. 
 
2.2. Extensive form: 
Also referred as the Game Tree, it is the graphical representation of sequential, a multiple game. 
It includes information about the players, strategies and the payoffs of those strategies. Each 
decision point is shown with a node and there are edges showing the results of these decisions. 
Every set of edges in the tree ends with one last node, terminal node, which indicates ending of 
the game. An example will be given in the next section. 
 
2.3. Nature: 
Not necessarily in every game, there are moves for each player that is not determined by any 
variables, are out of players’ control and is completely random. In the game of poker cards dealt 
to each player can be seen as the nature which does not depend on anything. 
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3. One-Card Poker With Unitary Bet Size: 
This is a two-player poker game played with a deck of 
three cards; an ace, a deuce and a trey. The players will be 
referred as the dealer and the opener. Each player places 1 unit 
of money into the pot, which is also known as ante, before the 
dealer deals one card to each of the player. Then according to 
their card, the opener checks or bets 1 more unit of money. If 
the opener bets, the dealer may either call or fold, if he folds, 
the opener wins the single unit of money which the dealer put 
into the pot as ante. If the dealer calls, there would be 
showdown and the player with the higher card would get all of the pot. But if the opener does not 
bet, checks, the dealer gets the opportunity to bet for the opener to either call the bet or fold. 
Each player can only gain a maximum of two units of money since the other two were placed by 
themselves in order to raise the pot. Since a player can only win only when the other player 
loses, the game is considered as a zero-sum game. This one-card poker game can be presented in 
extensive form as in the diagram below. 
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In the diagram above first three nodes from above are the options for the player and they 
all have payoffs or next nodes. The second set of nodes is the options for the opponent to move 
and the edges show the actions of the opponent and their possible outcomes. But it should be 
remembered this diagram is also a shortened version of the full 1-card poker game. For example 
you might check with your card in your hand and if the opponent bets you must either call or 
fold which would be same as betting or folding with your card in the first place. 
For example you are player 1 and you have the deuce in your hand. You choose to bet 
which is the resolution of the first node below deuce. From this point, fate of the game will be 
decided by the opponent, player 2. Opponent folds, you would win (+1) or opponent calls: there 
is a chance for either winning or losing 2 units. 
 
3.1. Dominated Strategies and Irrational Moves: 
Each unique line in the tree represents a different strategy that can be used for the game. 
But for our purposes, I won’t be analyzing the game through the extensive form with traditional 
ways. In order to transpose the game into economic moves; I will be inspecting every possible 
scenario in the game with their outcomes. In the diagram, there are some obvious strategies 
which should be eliminated from the available moves a player can make to decrease the number 
of scenarios that would not be occurring between two rational players. This next analysis was 
inspired by an article by Jason Swanson, “Game Theory and Poker”. There are a multiple of 
irrational moves that should be discarded from choice of options: 
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 Neither player should fold when the trey is in the hand. Trey would win against any other 
card in this game. The player should always bet with the trey if possible. 
 Neither player should call or bet with the ace, all the time. In order to optimize a strategy 
the player should not: never call or bet with the ace or always call or bet with the ace. But 
now, in order to have the next rule to make sense, I will just say that the player should 
never call or bet with the ace. (The optimal frequency of this move will be dealt with in 
the next section.) 
 Neither player should bet with the deuce. When the previous rule is considered, if the 
player bets with the deuce, the opponent will fold with the ace and call with the trey. If 
the opponent has an ace, betting with the deuce would have no meaning since the 
opponent would fold. If the opponent has a trey, the opponent would not hesitate to call 
this bet and instead of losing one unit of money if the player just checked, now the player 
would lose two units of money through the showdown. 
By following these rules, dominated strategies such as folding with the trey would be 
removed from the possible strategies. 
 
3.2. Expected Values: 
Considering that both of the players play according to these rules, the possible course of 
events is reduced. Before explaining these scenarios, the frequencies of actions each player take 
should be denoted. From this point players will be referred as the dealer and the opener to 
establish the scenarios. For the dealer: 
 Frequency of bluffing with the ace: d1 
 Frequency of calling with the deuce: d2 
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And for the opener: 
 Frequency of bluffing with the ace: o1 
 Frequency of calling with the deuce: o2 
 Frequency of betting with the trey: o3 
It must be remembered that these are frequency values, ∴ they can only be between 0 and 
1. It should be known that giving a frequency to betting with the trey is not an irrational move for 
the opener since betting might scare an opponent with holding an ace from bluffing which in this 
case would have been beneficial for the opener. 
 
3.2.1. Possible Scenarios and Their Outcomes: 
Considering that the antes placed before the game starts also counts for gained or lost 
money, making this a pre-ante expected value calculation, there are four possible outcomes to all 
of these scenarios for the opener: losing 2 units of money, losing 1 unit of money, winning 1 unit 
of money and winning 2 units of money. These scenarios are as followings: 
 The opener has the trey, the dealer has the deuce. 
o The opener bets and the dealer calls, so the opener wins 2 units of money. This is     
d2 x o3.  
o If the dealer does not call the bet, the opener wins a single unit of money which is   
(1-d2) x o3. 
o If the opener does not bet and the dealer checks, the game will go to a showdown 
with the antes and the opener wins a single unit of money. This is (1-o3). 
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 The opener has the trey and the dealer has the ace.  
o If the opener checks and the dealer bluffs and the bluff is called by the opener, the 
opener wins 2 units of money which is (1 - o3) x d1.  
o If the opener checks and the dealer also checks, the opener wins one unit of money 
via the showdown. This is (1-o3) x (1-d1). 
o If the opener bets, the dealer would be forced to fold since he would be holding the 
ace. The opener wins one unit of money with a probability of o3.   
 The opener has the deuce and the dealer has the trey.  
o If the opener calls the dealer’s bet, he loses 2 units of money which has a possibility 
of o2.  
o If the game goes to a showdown when the opener checks and is followed by the 
dealer’s check which is (1 - d3), the opener loses one unit of money. 
 The opener has the deuce and the dealer has the ace. 
o If the opener checks and the dealer bluffs and with a probability of d1 x o2 the opener 
calls and wins 2 units of money.  
o The opener might not call the dealers bluff by a probability of d1 x (1 - o2) and loses 
1 unit of money.  
o The other starting situation, the opener checks and the dealer also checks leading the 
game to a showdown with a probability of (1 - d1) and the opener wins 1 unit of 
money.  
 The opener has the ace and the dealer has the trey.  
o If the opener bluffs and is called with a probability of o1, he loses 2 units of money.  
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o If the opener checks and the dealer bets with the trey in his hand forcing the opener 
to call with a probability of (1-o1), the opener is forced to fold, and loses 1 unit of 
money.  
 The opener has the ace and the dealer has the deuce.  
o If the opener bluffs and the dealer folds with the deuce with a probability of             
o1 x (1 - d2) the opener wins 1 unit of money.  
o If the opener’s bluff is called with the probability o1 x d2, he loses 2 units of money.  
o If the opener does not bluff and checks; and the dealer also checks leading the game 
to a showdown with a probability (1 - o1), the opener loses 1 unit of money. 
These cards are received by the players by nature which gives each of these scenarios a 
probability of 1/3 x ½ = 1/6 to occur. The entire opener’s winning or losing scenarios can be put 
together. 
 Winning 2 units of money: 
P1 = 1/6 x [(d2 x o3) + ((1 - o3) x d1) + (d1 x o2)] 
 Winning 1 unit of money: 
P2 = 1/6 x [(1 - d2) x o3 + (1-o3) + (1-o3) x (1-d1) + o3 + (1 - d1) + o1 x (1 - d2)] 
 Losing 1 unit of money: 
P3 = 1/6 x [(1 - o2) + (1-o2) x d1 + (1 - o1) + (1 - o1)] 
 Losing 2 units of money:  
P4 = 1/6 x [o2 + o1 + o1 x d2] 
So this gives the opener an expected value of: 
EVO = 2 x P1 + P2 - P3 - 2 x P4  
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= 1/6 x (2d2o3 + 2d1 - 2d1o3 + 2d1o2 + o3 - d2o3 + 1 - o3 + 1 - d1 - o3 +d1o3 + o3 + 1 - d1 + o1 - d2o1 
- 1 + o2 - d1 + d1o2 - 1 + o1 -1 + o1 - 2o2 - 2o1 - 2d2o1) 
= 1/6 x (d2o3 - d1o3 + d1o2 - d2o1 - o2 + d3o1) 
This is, at the same time, the converse of the dealer’s expected value, EVD. 
 What game theory does is that, studying this equation to find a possible gap which will 
allow either player to keep their frequencies at a constant rate that cannot be affected by the 
opponent. Mathematically speaking, find a set of values for openers or dealers frequencies to 
eliminate the other set of values from the equation which creates an indifferent, consistent 
strategy. Such values cannot be always found. Initial values can be given for a game and the 
moves of the players can be inspected to see the EV changes. 
 
3.2.2. The opener’s expected value: 
EVO = 1/6 x [d1 x (3o2 - o3 - 1) + d2 x (o3 - 3o1) + o1 – o2] 
For the opener to have an indifferent strategy what he should do is to find a set of values 
for o1, o2 and o3 that would make d1’s and d2’s multiplier in  
 “1/6 x [d1 x (3o2 - o3 - 1) + d2 x (o3 - 3o1) + o1 – o2]” equal to zero: 
3o2 - o3 – 1 = 0 and o3 - 3o1 = 0 
Where we should start is the o3 - 3o1 = 0 equation. It can be seen that o3 = 3o1 and from 
that you can give the values o3 = 0, o1 = 0 which makes o2 = 1/3 for the opener to have an 
indifferent strategy. However these set of values give the opener an expected value of -1/18 
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which is for the dealer’s benefit. Other set of values can be found from the previous equation 
system providing that: 
o3 = 3o1 and 
 3o2 - o3 – 1 = 0. 
For example the opener can bluff with the ace 1/3 of the time where he should always bet 
with the trey, ∴ call with the deuce ⅔ of the time. But again it is seen that this also gives the 
opener an EV of -1/18, again which is beneficial for the dealer. 
 
3.2.3. The dealer’s expected value: 
EVD = 1/6 x [o3 x (d1 – d2) + o1 x (3d2 – 1) + o2 x (1-3d1) + d1] 
What should be done is: 
d1 – d2 = 0, 
3d2 – 1 = 0 and 
1-3d1 = 0. 
It can be easily seen that the only solution set for the system is d1 = d2 = 1/3. By doing 
this the dealer would have an EV of 1/18 which is beneficial for the dealer. Since it s indifferent, 
it does not depend on the opener’s moves so it is the optimal strategy for the dealer. If the players 
do not change positions, the dealer would always be winning in the long term. That simply 
would not be fair since the opponent can also see this. To avoid this situation, the players can 
change positions and each time the opponent who has become the dealer would also use the same 
optimal strategy and in the end, each player would have an EV of 0, ∴ no one wins and the game 
is stuck. So this is possibly not a path that will be chosen by the players since no one is winning. 
 
EgeSönmez, 001129 - 079 
15 
 
There are many scenarios where initial ratios for players’ moves can be set and then 
investigated to make it beneficial for either player but those situations will not be dealt here. 
They will be transposed into real life situations to interpret some decisions and actions of 
companies or small business’.  
4. Real World Situations: 
4.1. The Expansion of Airline Transportation in Turkey: 
Until a few years ago, the airline transportation was not popular and was considered 
luxurious in Turkey. Pegasus Airlines, a company which had its management renewed decided to 
start a campaign to initiate the “low cost model”. For every single domestic flight in the country, 
they reserved 5 seats and gave those seats to who tried to purchase a seat first, for free. This, of 
course lured the customers, the passengers, who were used to pay less for transportation and take 
a bus instead of a plane. After some time, the number of customers who knew the comfort and 
ease of flying on a plane instead of taking a bus increased and ignoring the price difference (by 
the way which was getting smaller and smaller), people started to choose airline transportation 
instead of land transportation. In fact, today, some domestic flights -thanks to the low cost model 
they started in Turkey- are cheaper than bus tickets to the same destination from the same place.  
In this case, the airline company can be considered as the opener and the dealers moves 
can be considered as the customers’ choices. And the EV of the dealer would be what happens to 
the land transportation. 
EVO = 1/6 x [d1 x (3o2 - o3 - 1) + d2 x (o3 - 3o1) + o1 – o2] 
At first we would take the customers as a consistent player one that does not bluff with 
the ace that often and that is afraid of calling with the deuce. Let’s give the values   d1 = 1/6 and   
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d2 = 1/3. Remember now this is the society’s behavior and the company is aware of this behavior 
and approaching to this. At first, the opener should not call with the deuce and bluff a lot with 
the ace to encourage the dealer (the customers) to call with the deuce and bluff with the ace too. 
The company started the 5 seat for free campaign to encourage people to try using the plane for 
transportation. Of course the airline company has a group of royal customers who are aware of 
the comfort of travelling via plane. Let’s give the probabilities o3=1 o2=0 and o1=1/2. 
This would give the opener an EV of +1/12. 
This is not much, but the airline is still earning money from this campaign and what they 
are doing is changing the view of the customer to use the airline transportation more which is, in 
a way bluffing with the ace and calling with the deuce, ∴ this EV will probably be consistent. 
Although it is more expensive for the customer, the customer is now aware of the comfort of 
travelling with the plane and will keep doing it. 
 
4.2. A Battle of Two Markets: 
 Consider this: There are two markets, considered rivals in the street. Let’s say every 
single product they have import rates for different categories of products: The expensive 
products that both markets consider to be risky, in means of consumption, rate as they might not 
get all sold; the middle priced products and the low priced products which are guaranteed to be 
sold.  
This first market, called the “opener” market, receives this new expensive product that is 
not being imported to the opposite “dealer” market.  The opener market is worried that this new 
product would not be well received and gives this item an import rate of o1=¼ similar to bluffing 
with an ace knowing that it might be called. To secure their business, the opener market gives a 
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high ratio of o3=¾ for its import of cheap products which are guaranteed to be sold, similar to 
betting with the trey which is guaranteed to beat any hand in the previously discussed poker 
game. And then sets o2=¼, rate of importing mid-priced products in order to, let’s say, divert the 
customers’ attention to the other two groups of products.  
  As a response to this act, the dealer market keeps their own pricey product import rate at 
low as d1=¼ and, relatively, increase their mid-priced product import rate to d2=½. Again, let’s 
say their cheap products are trusted and efficiently sold, ∴ the rate of importing should be 1 for 
them. Yet as it will be seen from the equation, it has no effect on the opener market’s EV. Again 
let’s consider, this is due to the fact that the dealer market’s cheap products are more trustworthy. 
And this can actually be interpreted from the poker game: the opener knows that if the dealer has 
the trey, he will definitely call or bet since at that point there is nothing for the opener to do. The 
trey in dealer’s hand is more useful than the trey in opener’s hand. 
 EVO = 1/6 x [d1 x (3o2 - o3 - 1) + d2 x (o3 - 3o1) + o1 – o2] 
 When the values are placed in the equation, it is found that the opener market’s EV 
becomes -1/24. This indicates that opener market is, in the long term, losing money. At this point 
opener market may try to prompt their customers to the expensive products by increasing o1 to ½ 
and by decreasing o3 to ½ while keeping the mid-priced product import rate still at low by o2=¼. 
To this move the dealer market would react by keeping its mid-priced product import rate d2=½ 
and letting the opener market take the risk by decreasing its own expensive product import rate 
to d1=1/8. 
 It is seen that the new EV didn’t worked for opener market. The new EV is -11/192, 
opener market is still losing money; going on with the new expensive product is not working for 
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the opener market. What they should have done was to decreasing o1 to 1/8 and maximizing the 
other import rates as o2 = o3 = 1. To this, dealer market would have tried to put their expensive 
products forward by making d1 = 1 and decreasing d2 to ¼. This works for the opener market and 
gives the opener market the EV of +3/64.  
But of course this will be seen by the dealer market and a counter strategy will be 
improvised and the battle of the two markets will keep going on. 
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5. Conclusion: 
The initial analysis was used to examine and transpose the moves talked about in the real 
world situations. The moves in the poker game were successfully adapted to the real world 
situations and every move made by the players in the real world situations could have been 
explained by referring to the poker game. The EV equation found was usable to calculate the 
payoffs of the players and produce conclusions of from their decisions. 
From the expected value calculations it was seen that the dealer had an indifferent 
strategy that gave him an EV of +1/18. The dealer had the advantage in the two-player one-card 
poker game. Therefore in the real world situations, beneficial situations for the opener were tried 
to be achieved. Both players altered their move rates but it was never seemed as the most 
beneficial for the dealer to use their indifferent strategy. The EV was constantly being altered 
due to changes made by the players as a reaction to the opposing player’s movement changes. 
All these changes were easily explained as this was the poker game previously analyzed. 
This brings to my mind a saying that I ran into multiple times during my research by a 
famous poker player David Sklansky: “Poker is the only game where it is correct to play 
incorrect.” Considering what is tried to be shown in this essay, it can be said that same thing 
applies to many situations that can be referred to as a “game”. And from what is seen by having 
the opener a positive EV in a game that is disadvantageous for them, it can be said that it is not 
important what you have or where you are in a game, what’s important is how you can make use 
of what you have and where you are. The same thing can be said about life itself, and in the end, 
life is a game, isn’t it?  
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6. Appendix 
 
Bet: It is to increase the amount of money each player should place by placing a fixed amount of money 
in the pot. 
Ante: It is the initially placed money by each player in order to receive a hand. 
Bluff: To falsely persuade the opponent to imply that the player has a good hand, by betting while holding 
a bad hand. 
Call: Accepting the opponent’s bet and placing same amount of money as the bet. 
Check: Not betting or calling when it is the player’s turn to move. 
Fold: Refusing to call the opponents bet and forfeiting the hand at the cost of the player’s own money in 
the pot. 
Showdown: Each player shows their cards to decide who wins the pot after the betting is finished. 
Dealer: The player in the game who deals the card and moves last in every round. 
Opener: The player who moves first each round. 
End Game: The term refers to the final round of a poker game where no more cards are given to any 
players and the players bet for last time. 
Rational Player: Name given to a player in any game who would never use dominated strategies and use 
indifferent strategies if possible. 
Payoff: It is the result of actions or a strategy, winnings or loss’ in a game. 
Expected Value: It is the weighted average of every possible result in a game. 
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